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Judicial Independence
and the State Court Funding Crisis
DavidJ. Barron,
INTRODUCTION
T HE fiscal crisis is undermining the capacity of the state courts to
deliver justice in a timely manner. It is doing so by leading state
legislatures to slash funding for their judicial systems. In response, state
court leaders and their supporters are beginning to pursue new strategies
for protecting their budgets. Among the most prominent are two that
point in different directions. One focuses on mounting more effective
lobbying campaigns so that state courts can "win" the increasingly fierce
competition that defines the legislative appropriations process! The other
focuses on finding alternative funding mechanisms so that state courts
can bypass the legislative appropriations process altogether. These two
strategies can overlap, and they often do. But whether they are substitutes
or complements, their emergence reveals that the fiscal crisis is altering the
political economy in which state court leaders and their advocates operate.
This essay focuses on the problematic incentives that this new political
economy creates. It raises the concern that these incentives encourage
state court leaders and their advocates to embrace fiscal solutions that
pose underappreciated risks to judicial independence. In doing so, it
distinguishes between two aspects of judicial independence-fiscal
independence and decisional independence. The former concerns the
judicial interest in making independent budgetary decisions about the
resources the judicial branch needs to carry out its core constitutional
functions. The latter concerns the judicial interest in making independent
I S. William Green Professor of Public Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank
Jeff Amestoy, the Hon. Paul DeMuniz, Rosalyn Frierson, Jerry Frug, Mary McQueen, Chris
Stone and Vicki Jackson, for their comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful for support
from the Harvard Kennedy School Executive Session on State Court Leaders in the 2ist
Century, Dean David Schizer at Columbia Law School, and the National Center for the State
Courts. I would also like to thank Paige Austin for excellent research assistance.
2 Because a majority of states' court systems are funded primarily on the state level, this
article will focus on the dynamics at work in state-level appropriations. But the argument
is equally applicable to states that fund courts through local or hybrid state-local mecha-
nisms. For a breakdown of how each state's court systems is funded, see State Activities Map,
NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/
Budget-Resource-Center/States-activities-map/.aspx.
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legal decisions in resolving the cases that states are given jurisdiction to
decide. With this distinction in mind, the essay argues that success in
solving the fiscal crisis cannot be measured solely in terms of whether state
courts receive adequate funding. Attention must also be paid to whether
the means used to secure such funding compromise the ability of the courts
to decide impartially the cases that come before them.
This essay pursues this argument by exploring the upsurge of interest
in addressing the funding crisis in constitutional terms. It shows that this
constitutional talk usually focuses on protecting the fiscal independence of
the judiciary, and it argues that this focus is not likely to advance the argument
for greater fiscal support to any great extent. It then argues that such talk is
nonetheless of interest. It prompts reflection about whether there is another
aspect of judicial independence, namely decisional independence, that is
unwittingly being put at risk through well-intentioned efforts to solve the
fiscal crisis by protecting the fiscal independence of the courts. The essay
concludes by using two concrete case studies-Florida's experiment with
tying state court funding to foreclosure filing fees and South Carolina's
enlistment of the business community in the campaign for more judicial
funding-to examine that question. These case studies reveal that state
court leaders and their advocates increasingly find themselves caught
up in a budgetary process that encourages them to place the decisional
independence of the judiciary at risk in hopes of securing more funding for
their branch. In emphasizing the complexity of the relationship between
judicial independence and the funding crisis, the essay has a simple aim. It
seeks to make it less likely that those responsible for solving the funding
crisis will do so in ways that, however unintentionally, undermine judicial
independence in the name of standing up for it.
I. THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE FISCAL CRISIS
Discussions of the harm caused by the crisis in state court funding
tend to stress the important service that state courts provide and the way
that reductions in state court funding diminish their capacity to continue
providing that same level of service.3 The familiar account emphasizes a
host of specific harmful effects. Existing local courthouses would have to
be closed. Courts that remain open would have to reduce their hours. No
new courthouses would be opened. No new judges would be added to
relieve the congestion brought on by an expanding and crushing docket.
3 See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 5 (20I), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/contenr/dam/abaimages/public-education/pub-ed-lawday-aba-
resolutioncrisiscourtsdec2oI i.pdf ("The Task Force has heard many accounts of the extent
and results of such chronic underfunding. To cite but one state's experience, the courts in
Georgia have seen their funding shrink 25% over the last two years.... As a result, criminal
cases now routinely take more than a year to resolve .... ").
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Innovations in the delivery of court-administered justice, whether in
the form of so-called problem solving courts or technological updates to
antiquated records and filing systems, would come to an end. Relatedly,
funding reductions would make it impossible to provide the pay necessary
to retain many of the best people serving in the system-from court
administrators to judges.
4
The resulting picture is of a state judicial system defined by delay
and burdened with crumbling facilities. On top of this, the specter of a
reduction in overall quality looms. There is a great risk that talented people
will exit-or refuse to enter-a once prestigious line of work. Making the
tragedy all the more acute is the fact that this declining system is not
simply another component of an aging bureaucracy. It is a special branch of
government, charged with a precious task-dispensing justice. Its decline
means that individuals will be unable to get the justice they seek. To make
the point, advocates tell dramatic stories of individual hardship that can
result from reduced funding. There is the small business that cannot open
due to legal delays, or the custody decision that goes unresolved because of
a lack of judicial time to attend to it.'
This way of putting the case is powerful. Pitched in these terms it is
also wholly unobjectionable. Backlogged, unresponsive courts are hard to
square with a commitment to the rule of law or the vindication of justice.
Advocates are right to force state legislators to confront the resulting
contradiction between the ideals of our legal system and its reality. Still,
many of those who make this argument share the sense that it fails to capture
the full dimensions of the problem. One repeatedly hears from state court
leaders that the judiciary is not just another "agency" of government.6 It is,
rather, a coordinate branch, a constitutional department. It is not as if the
legislature needs to defend its existence. Why, then, they ask, should the
state court system?
4 Id. at 3, 5.
5 Id.; see also Sandy Adkins, StateBudget Cuts Threaten Public's Access to Courts, NAT'L CTR. FOR
ST. CTs. BACKOROUNDER (Nov. a9, 201i), http://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Backgrounder/2oi/
Court-Budget-Cuts.aspx; John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y
TIMES, Nov. z6, 2011, at Ai8; Daniel Hall, Reshaping the Face of Justice: The Economic Tsunami
Continues, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. Crs. 1-2 (2o11), http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-
Resources/Budget-Resource-Center/States-activities-map/.aspx ("For example, in small-
to-medium-sized courts, staff shortages have led to errors that impact defendants by failing
to cancel warrants in a timely manner, leading to wrongful arrests.... Large courts report that
domestic-relations temporary orders and parenting-time disputes are delayed."); William M.
Welch, Court Budget Cuts Swift Hand of Justice, USA TODAY, Apr. I, 20oo, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/nation/2oo-o3-3 i-court-cutsN.htm ("[Wlait times are getting longer for those
with civil, family, juvenile and traffic cases....").
6 See, e.g., Rosalyn Frierson, A New Approach to Budget Negotiation for South Carolina's
Judiciary 3-4 (Oct. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Paul J. De Muniz,
Judicial Budgeting, The Separation of Powers, and Institutional Independence 14-17 (April
15, 201 I) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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In making the funding case in terms of the practical need for state
courts to provide important services, state court leaders wonder if they
are downplaying their constitutional status as a coordinate branch and
inappropriately adopting the language of ordinary agency-speak.7 Time
and again, state court leaders emphasize that the courts are not just another
part of the bureaucracy, only to revert to standard bureaucratic tactics
in the search for more funds. Their inability to rise above the routine of
budgetary infighting is a source of constant frustration. Thus, as powerful as
the case for more funding may be when put in practical human terms, there
is a strong sense among many state court leaders that there is something
problematic with having to make it at all. 8
Perhaps for this reason, state court leaders, as well as advocates for them,
have begun to show interest in a different kind of discursive framework.
Rather than sticking to the numbers and laying out the statistical effect of
budget cuts, and rather than emphasizing human interest stories that make
these numbers come to life, they have begun to embrace a constitutional
argument on behalf of their branch. This way of talking about the
crisis emphasizes the constitutional pedigree of the state courts as an
independent branch of government. It then identifies what is claimed to
be the constitutional offense that results from disregarding the judiciary's
judgment of its own fiscal needs.9
The shift to the constitutional plane holds out the promise of securing
for the judiciary a means of escaping from the ordinary budgetary process.
The branch's independence would be vindicated, and its bottom line would
be protected. What is not to like? This stirring of interest in a constitutional
claim for adequate state court funding-a claim that in some way mimics
7 1 was a participant, and member of the steering committee, for the Executive Session
for State Court Leaders in the zist Century at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
The executive session was a multi-year project that convened academics, state court admin-
istrators, state court trial judges, and state court chief justices to discuss a variety of challenges
facing state courts, including those arising from the budget crisis. Throughout the executive
session, participants at all levels of the state court system expressed the concern that courts
were entering budget negotiations as if they were mere "agencies."
8 Id.; see also Greg Rowe, Keeping Courts Funded: Recommendations on How Courts
Can Avoid the Budget Axe i (April 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); De
Muniz, supra note 6, at 1-3, 14-15, 17-18; Frierson, supra note 6, at 5.
9 See Christine Durham, Chief Justice, Utah Supreme Court, Remarks at the University
of Kentucky Symposium on Underfunding of State Courts: Autonomy, Access and
Accountability (Sep. 23, 201 i), available at http://www.abanow.org/zoi 1/o9/autonomy-ac-
cess-and-accountability-sparks-debate-at-kentucky-court-crisis-symposium-part- i/; De
Muniz, supra note 6, at 5; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law,
Keynote Address at the University of Kentucky Symposium on Underfunding of State Courts
(Sep. 23, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2o 1/o9/opening-remarks-to-the-sympo-
sium-on-court-underfunding-pt-2. For a prominent example of a state court judicial leader
putting this argument into practice, see Complaint at 25-31, Kaye v. Silver, No. 2008-400763
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 1o, 2oo8), 2oo8 WL 7702434.
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the state constitutional claim for adequate public school funding-is
evident from the submissions to this symposium." But what should one
make of this constitutional talk? Is there a legally enforceable constitutional
limitation on the legislature's ability to curtail judicial functions through
budget cuts? And if there is, are judicial leaders and their advocates well-
advised to advance it?
It is by delving into these questions that one can begin to see the
complexity of the relationship between the funding crisis and state
court judicial independence. There is an assumption in much of the
constitutional analysis that it is the loss of funds that is threatening
judicial independence, and thus that a focus on the need to protect the
independence of the judiciary will reinforce the argument for more money.
But a deeper examination of the nature of the relationship between the
fiscal crisis and judicial independence reveals a paradox. Some of the most
attractive seeming solutions to that very fiscal crisis may do as much to
undermine judicial independence as to protect it.
II. THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE FISCAL CRISIS
The tangible harmful effects of reduced funding underlie the felt sense
of crisis in the state courts. And it is that crisis that has in turn spurred
interest in constitutional arguments that would enable the judiciary to
fend off further cuts. The kind of constitutional argument that would
help, therefore, is one that would do something to protect the budgetary
bottom line of the state courts. So understood, the constitutional claim is
worth making only if it would be fiscally advantageous to make it. There
is little point in pursuing a point of constitutional principle in the name of
protecting the judiciary's finances if doing so would make it less likely the
state courts would receive even the amount of funding they would get if
they cooperated with their appropriators.
So, is there a constitutional claim that would yield such a fiscal benefit
by forcing the state legislature to honor it? One can point to shards of text
and prior precedents to fashion such a claim, at least as against certain
extreme forms of fiscal interference." At the extreme, such a constitutional
io See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium on State Court Funding: Keynote Address, ioo
Ky. L.J. 743 2012; William T (Bill) Robinson III, Foreword: Restoring Luster to the Palladium of
Freedom, l oo Ky. L.J. 729, 733-34 (2012); G. Alan Tarr, No Exit: The FinancialCrisis Facing State
Courts, uoo Ky. L.J. 785, 790-96 (2012).
ii See Complaint at 25-3 i, Kaye, No. 2008-400763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 10, 2008),
zoo8 WL 7702434 (alleging legislature's failure to raise New York state judges' salaries for ten
years was violation of the judicial compensation clause and separation of powers under New
York Constitution); Orlando E. Delogu, Funding the Judicial Department at a Level the Supreme
Judicial Court Deems "Essential to Its Existence and Functioning as a Court" Is Required by Doctrines
of Comity andDuties Imposedby Maine's Constitution, 62 ME. L. REV. 453,467 (20 1 o) (arguing that
multiple clauses of the Maine constitution establish a duty upon elected officials to provide
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claim (if backed up by a lawsuit) may have purchase against especially
draconian budgetary cuts. And the more severe those cuts are, the more
plausible it becomes to think such a claim would be successful. In that
respect, the constitutional turn may ultimately yield a fiscal benefit. It at
least begins the work of developing a legal claim that may prove useful
in some circumstances. But there is no need to pursue the analysis of the
merits of such a constitutional claim more fully here. However strong such
a claim may prove to be in certain circumstances, it seems clear that, in
general, it would be fiscally counterproductive to rely upon a constitutional
claim to fiscal independence as a means of securing the state court funding
that the current fiscal crisis puts at risk.
One reason is that any such constitutional claim is necessarily dependent
on a judgment about the minimum level of state court funding the state
(or federal?) constitution requires. That judgment can be made, however,
only by determining what the constitutionally adequate minimum level of
judicial service provision is. That is, quite obviously, a hugely contestable
issue. It is also one that is not likely to be resolved in a manner that will
redound to the judiciary's fiscal benefit. That is because, however serious
the crisis in funding may seem at present, there is still reason to fear
that the constitutional floor for such funding would be quite low. After
all, the constitutional floor for adequate service provision is likely to be
rooted in a rather stripped down vision of the judiciary's essential or core
constitutional function. The pursuit of a constitutionl claim, therefore, may
only encourage the public and the legislature to focus on the need to fund
state court services through the prism of a constitutional minimum rather
than an aspirational maximum. That development would hardly advance
the judiciary's fiscal interests. Consider that state courts have a powerful
case to make about their need for additional funding, whether to permit
them to update update technology or to expand services through specialized
courts. It is doubtful, though, that such improvement plans could really
be grounded in a constitutional imperative. Even worse, the assertion of
a legal claim aimed at protecting the core constitutional functions of the
courts might not only fail to succeed in litigation. The assertion of such a
claim could even undermine a legislative strategy aimed at securing funds
for innovations in judicial management and the delivery of court services.
The constitutional claim might inadvertently draw attention to the chief
function of the judiciary (deciding cases) and thus raise the question
"those funds the Law Court deems necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial branch
as a coordinate, co-equal branch of state government serving Maine's citizens"); Daniel W.
Halston, The Meaning of the Massachusetts "Open Courts" Clause and Its Relevance to the Current
Court Crisis, 88 MAss. L. R. 122, 129 (zoo4) ("Citizens who are denied or delayed justice be-
cause of a mismanagement, misallocation or lack of funding of judicial resources may have
redress under Article i i [of the Massachusetts Constitution].").
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whether such cutting-edge improvement plans are truly constitutionally
necessary? In other words, they could begin to look like a luxury.
There is a further reason to be skeptical that an actual constitutional
challenge would be fiscally beneficial. It is one thing to engage with the
legislature in the ordinary to and fro of budget negotiations and to assert
the judicial branch's constitutional status in the course of doing so. Such a
rhetorical approach may assist the judicial branch's position in negotiations.
It is another thing entirely, however, to provoke a direct legal clash with
the branch of government that is traditionally responsible for appropriating
the funds on which the judiciary depends. To be sure, the specter of
constitutional litigation brought by judges, before judges, may help shape
budgetary negotiations. It may even help tilt those talks in the judiciary's
favor by warning legislators against provoking a confrontation that could
end up in a courtroom, with a judge presiding. It seems unlikely, however,
that the threat of constitutional litigation, or, worse, the fact of it, could
actually yield a viable and sustainable means of securing more judicial
funding.
In the end, no matter how courts would rule in cases asserting the
legislature's constitutional obligation to provide a certain level of funding to
the state courts, the legislature still would actually need to make the funds
available for the courts to benefit. Will the legislature do so even if ordered
by the courts? And what if the legislature will not, or what if it will comply
only in the most grudging of ways? The prospect of state courts actually
taking control of the budgeting process, and diverting funds otherwise
aimed at other social programs so that the courts may use them is not an
appealing one-even, one suspects, to judges themselves. The friction that
could build up between the judiciary and the legislative branch along the
way, moreover, would not be helpful in the actual legislative negotiations
over budgeting that will necessarily continue to take place. Indeed, the
resulting tension could do long-term damage to the judiciary in future
rounds of budgeting.
Constitutional concerns also have recently been raised about another
budgetary practice that impacts the state courts."2 These concerns relate to
the judiciary's practice in some states of including its budget request in the
overall budget request that the executive branch submits to the legislature.
13
Here, too, the constitutional objection arises from a sense that this practice
12 See De Muniz, supra note 6, at 3-5.
13 Id. at 9 ("[In Oregon,] [tihe judicial branch request is incorporated into the Governor's
budget, but not without a certain amount of executive branch manipulation that, in the ex-
treme, can both negatively impact the judiciary and exceed the constitutional limits of execu-
tive branch power."); see also CARL BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 25-59 (1975) (detailing means by which executive branches of govern-
ment "in almost every state" participate in processing judicial budget requests).
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is not only fiscally disadvantageous, but also constitutionally troublesome.1 4
This objection does sound more directly in a defense of the judicial branch's
constitutional independence, independent of its immediate fiscal interests,
than does the constitutional argument for adequate state court funding.
The claim is not that the legislature has a constitutional obligation to honor
the judiciary's budget request. It is merely that the judiciary should not
be subordinated to the executive in making that very request. Thus, the
focus is more squarely on finding a legal basis for insulating the judiciary
from second-guessing by a coordinate branch-this time the executive
branch-than is the case with the quest for a certain, legally enforceable
minimum funding level.
Still it is the risk that the executive will refuse to put forward the
entirety of the judicial funding request that ultimately motivates the
new interest in objecting to the practice of going through the executive
in the first place. And so, here, too, it is a worry about the negative fiscal
impact of an alleged infringement of judicial independence that lurks in
the background. But would that fiscal concern be meaningfully addressed
by asserting the judiciary's independent right to submit its budget request
separately?
Even those who have raised constitutional concerns with the practice
of submitting state judicial budget requests to the governor recognize
there is a practical concern with using the state constitution as a sword
in this context."5 Consider what is likely to happen if the state judiciary
refuses on constitutional grounds to follow an established judicial practice
of wrapping the courts' budget request in the governor's. By making the
point of constitutional principle, the judiciary will risk antagonizing the
executive branch in the ensuing budgetary competition. And for what gain?
Nothing prevents the governor from publicly (or privately) advising the
legislature of his own concerns about the amount of funding the judiciary
has requested, even if the judicial request is sent over separately. Because
it may well be the state court leader's ability to enlist the governor as an
ally in those budget negotiations that may best protect the judiciary's
appropriations interests, it is hard to see why that state court leader should
find much appeal in the pursuit of a less cooperative approach to judicial-
executive relations concerning budgeting. Again, the logic of separation of
powers-to which state court leaders are increasingly inclined to appeal
as a refuge from the muck and mire of inter-agency fiscal haggling-is
a poor match with the judiciary's interest in securing as large a share of a
diminishing fiscal pie as is possible.
Constitutional defenses of judicial independence do, of course, rest on
something more than a desire to protect the judiciary's fiscal health. They
14 See De Muniz, supra note 6, at 1 1-12 ("[Mlany state judicial budgets today are subject
to a degree of executive branch control never contemplated by the state's constitution ... .
15 Id. at 12.
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owe their appeal in part to their defense of the branch's dignity. They are not
unlike the argument the Supreme Court invoked on behalf of the dignity
of the states in recognizing state sovereign immunity as constitutionally
inviolable.1 6 But under the pressure of serious fiscal calamity, it is not likely
that legislative appropriators will be much impressed by airy appeals to
the dignity of the judicial system. More likely, they will be interested in
learning, in practical and human terms, what would be wrong with cutting
this or that line out of the state judiciary's budget request. For that reason,
the courts likely will find themselves, for all the huffing and puffing about
their constitutional status, once again in the weeds, trying to make their
case for more funding than the education department, the transportation
department or any number of executive agencies. After all, the states that
invoked their dignity in the sovereign immunity cases were not asking for
anything affirmative from the legislature. They were merely seeking to
have the courts protect them from the imposition of judicial orders. By
contrast, the judicial branch would be appealing to its dignity in order to
coerce a different branch to provide resources to it. The affirmative nature
of the claim makes it much less likely to succeed, as is generally the case
in a constitutional system like ours, in which negative liberty claims have
always been better received in court than positive liberty ones.
But even worse than the fact that such a claim may fail to persuade in
litigation, is the possibility that it may prove to have a negative influence
on the legislative appropriations process. Assertions of constitutional
prerogative may taint the judiciary's budget request in the eyes of many
legislators. It may make the request seem less like the product of a careful
assessment of what efficient operations require than the result of an entitled
institution's refusal to engage in the hard work tough fiscal times demand. 7
Of course, rhetorical references to constitutional independence may aid
the judiciary's negotiating position in marginal respects. After all the United
States is famous for not taking a policy argument seriously unless it can be
linked to some constitutional imperative. Casting the judiciary's funding
needs in constitutional terms may thus serve useful ends. Predicting
whether such an argument will do more rhetorical harm than good is
difficult, and it is perhaps impossible to make a generalized judgment
given the diverse political circumstances prevailing in various states. It is
not likely, however, that such an argument will do much more than help
16 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) ("The States thus retain 'a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.' They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political cor-
porations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty." (citation omit-
ted)); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("The Eleventh Amendment
does not exist solely in order to 'preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out of
a State's treasury'.., it also serves to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' (citations omitted)).
17 See Rowe, supra note 8, at 3.
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rhetorically. It certainly is not likely to provide an enforceable means
of escaping the intense budgetary competition that so many state court
leaders find concerning. Indeed, those closest to the budget negotiating
process sometimes even counsel court advocates not to rely on appeals to
the judicial branch's special constitutional status at all, precisely because
the marginal upside of doing so is understood to be so small relative to the
downside risk.18
The emergence of this constitutional talk is, however, a noteworthy
development even if though it is not a rhetorical framing that is all that
likely to be successful. Such talk gives voice to an intuitively powerful
sense that there is something constitutionally problematic with the
current state of state court budgeting, and that the defect with the current
budgetary process goes beyond the reduced level of state court funding
that it yields. There -is something constitutionally problematic, such talk
reminds us, with the very process by which state court leaders are required
to make the case that their branch deserves more. But just what is the
nature of that constitutional concern? Why is it wrong, as a matter of our
constitutional structure, to force state courts to make their case for more
funding through the same budgetary process that virtually every other
provider of government services must engage in? And, if there is something
wrong with forcing them to do so, is it something that can be cured simply
by ensuring that courts emerge from that process adequately funded?
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FISCAL AND DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE
There is reason to think that the answer to the last question might
be, "No." The preservation of the constitutional independence of the
judiciary surely depends upon more than the protection of its right to
make autonomous judgments about the resources it needs to carry out its
constitutional responsibilities. And the preservation of such independence
surely also depends upon more than ensuring that the state courts are well-
funded. There is more to the constitutional independence of the courts
than the judiciary's interest in maintaining what might usefully be called
fiscal independence. There is another aspect to the concept of judicial
independence that is no less important. It concerns the judiciary's interest
in deciding individual cases, or classes of cases, on the legal merits and free
from outside pressure. It is the idea that the state courts come to each case
impartially and with no externally-imposed reason for favoring a particular
outcome. This aspect of judicial independence might usefully be called
the judicial interest in maintaining decisional independence.
The interest in decisional independence finds its clearest expression
in Article III of the Constitution, which ensures the federal court system
18 Id.
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is staffed by judges who enjoy life tenure and whose salaries cannot be
diminished. 19 Alone among constitutional officers, judges enjoy this
insulation from political supervision in carrying out their basic task of
resolving cases and controversies.20 The same idea, however, also undergirds
the state court system, even though the means of selecting state court
judges varies and, in many states, requires that they stand for election.2'
The desire to protect decisional independence explains why judicial
elections for state court judges continue to provoke concern.2 1 It also
explains why the trend is towards a merit-based selection system. 23 The
same concern explains why high profile judicial recall efforts, as well as
attempts to "punish" state judges for their decisions, elicit such consistent
concern from the bar.24 The desire to preserve the decisional independence
of the state courts also helps explain the recent Supreme Court decision
imposing due process limitations on the West Virginia Supreme Court's
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
20 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
21 See JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
AMERICA 57-83 (forthcoming 2o 12).
22 See, e.g., Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Perik The EndangeredBalance
Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229 (2oo8);
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 689, 726 (1995); Paul J. De Muniz, Eroding the Public's Confidence in JudicialImpartiality:
First Amendment Federal Jurisprudence and Special Interest Financing of Judicial Campaigns, 67
ALB. L. REV. 763 (2004).
23 Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience
and the Activism of the Sup reme Court, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1965, 1978-79 (2oi i) (describing gradual
adoption by over thirty states of some form of "merit selection" for judges on highest state
courts or intermediate courts of appeal); Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 22, at 1246.
24 See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Former Supreme Court Justice, The Essentials and
Expendables of the Missouri Plan, Address to University of Missouri Law School Symposium:
Mulling Over the Missouri Plan (Feb. 27, 2009), in 74 Mo. L. REV. 479, 486 (2009) ("[Alt
the very least [merit selection systems] have done a great deal to eliminate politics from
the decision about whether or not to retain judges. That alone is a pretty strong advantage
over the open-election system." (emphasis in original)); Margaret H. Marshall, The Promise of
Neutrality: Reflections on Judicial Independence, HUM. RTS., Winter 2009, at 3, 4, available at http:l/
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishinghuman-rights-magazine/irr-hr-wintero9-
PDFPromiseOfNeutrality.authcheckdam.pdf ("[T]he pressures to politicize the judiciary
are most severe in those states that employ a retention system, whether elective or appoint-
ive."); Maura Dolan, Reection of Iowa Judges Over Gay Marriage Raises Fears of Political Influence,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2oo, http://articles.latimes.comlprint2oio/nov/o5/ocal/la-me-gay-jus-
tice-2010105 (quoting California Chief Justice Ronald George as saying the Iowa recall il-
lustrated that "[tihe election of judges is not necessarily the best way to select them" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); O'Connor: Keep Iowa Judge System, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept.
8, 20o0, http://www.omaha.com/article/20ioo9o8/NEWS97/709099977 (speaking to the Iowa
Bar Association before the recall vote, O'Connor argued "It]he judges should not be subject
to retaliation" and said expensive judicial elections have "'eroded the faith of many of our
citizens in the judicial system"').
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recusal rules.2 5 The court imposed constitutional limits on judges sitting
in cases who may have been influenced by campaign contributions from
the parties to such cases. 6 And, of course, the instinct to protect decisional
independence is reflected in the combination of doctrines and traditional
practices that together cast suspicion upon legislative attempts to dictate
the outcome of a pending case. 7
A concern with protecting decisional independence would not lead
one to take aim solely at the reduced funds state courts receive to do their
work, even though the crisis is reducing them. Nor would it cause one to
focus only on the ways the budget process offends the courts' dignity, even
though it may be offending it. Such a concern would instead provoke one
to challenge the budget process brought on by the fiscal crisis insofar as
it forces the judiciary to seek out, and then accept, funding solutions that
compromise its ability to decide cases impartially.
On first glance, it may not seem as if the fiscal crisis results in a budget
process that is having this adverse effect on decisional independence.
Legislators certainly did not invent the funding crisis in order to punish
judges for making unpopular decisions. Nor is there evidence that state
legislatures are using the crisis to force state courts to decide certain cases
in certain ways if they wish to be treated well in the final budget talks.
Indeed, far from singling courts out for special treatment, state legislatures
seem instead to be subjecting the judiciary to across-the-board funding
cuts that apply equally to ordinary agencies of the government. However
much that blunderbuss approach may reflect great disrespect for the
institutional independence of the judiciary, it can hardly be equated
with politically motivated impeachment proceedings, high profile recall
campaigns, or substantive jurisdiction stripping laws. It is a neutral attempt
to save money, not a targeted effort to bend future judicial outcomes to
political will. For that reason, it may seem to pose more of a threat to the
judiciary's fiscal independence than to its decisional independence.
And yet, there are troubling indications the crisis is placing the judiciary's
decisional independence at risk. The threat arises from the entirely
understandable way in which state court leaders and their advocates are
responding to the intensified fiscal competition the fiscal crisis sparked.
The ways in which this risk arises are subtle, and the threat to decisional
independence that is involved is admittedly indirect. But that does not
make the threat to judicial independence insignificant.
There has always been a competitive element to state court budgeting.
It would be nalve to think that the pre-crisis budgeting process posed no
risk to the judiciary's decisional independence. As with any "agency" of
25 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009).
26 Id.
27 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
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government that is dependent upon appropriations, there is the potential
that state courts will also be mindful of how those controlling the purse
strings will judge their work. That courts might perceive there to be
a fiscal benefit to compromising their decisional independence in order
to curry favor with the legislature under a general appropriations system
cannot be ruled out. That system itself may be sufficiently politicized as
to encourage a state court system to assign certain judges to handle certain
categories of cases known to be of interest to powerful legislators, or to
promulgate rules of procedure that favor case outcomes to the liking of
those same representatives. But although there is no crisp evidence of
the phenomenon, it is certainly the case that the fiscal crisis makes this
risk far more acute. That is because the crisis has, by all accounts, made
the intergovernmental competition for favorable funding treatment
far more intense for the simple reason that funds are scarcer. Under the
weight of the fiscal pressure, state courts are no longer viewed as a special
branch of government that is entitled to a fair amount of deference in
the appropriations process. Court leaders cannot sit back, therefore, and
assume their request will be taken seriously and likely granted, with only
modest tweaks here or there. Because courts are increasingly treated as if
they are but one more claimant on the public fisc, and one more target for
cuts by legislatures desperate to find ways to offset declining revenues,
they must adjust their approach. They must now engage fully in the fiscal
competition if they are to win a meaningful share of state funds."8 And the
more the budgetary dynamic encourages state courts to adopt that more
aggressive approach, the more risk there is that, at the margins, they will
take steps that could make them more appealing candidates for legislative
largesse but that would compromise their decisional independence.
State courts leaders (and their advocates) have responded in two
important ways to these dynamics, neither of which is, by design, aimed at
compromising the decisional independence of the state courts, even though
that is their potential consequence. First, they have pursued funding
solutions that would exempt courts from the annual budgeting process (in
hopes of exempting themselves from the very competitive process just
described), and second, they have begun mounting full-fledged legislative
campaigns that publicly enlist powerful interest groups as allies in that
process (in hopes of winning a fiscal competition in which they can no
longer simply expect to do well).,9 These strategies are well-intentioned
and are even sometimes quite effective in (at least temporarily) addressing
the harm to the judiciary's fiscal independence that would follow from a
severe funding reduction. And, it must be emphasized, neither approach
z8 See De Muniz, supra note 6, at 14-15; Rowe, supra note 8, at 2-3.




is directly at odds with the value of judicial impartiality. But they are
potentially problematic approaches nonetheless.
They each have the worrisome effect of putting the decisional
independence of the state courts at greater risk than it would be under
the pre-cisis, general appropriations budgeting process, in which norms of
deference to the judicial branch's unique role prevailed. These alternative
approaches tie the continued financial health of the state court system to
discrete funding structures that will predictably be implicated by future
legal challenges. They also align the judiciary's budgetary success with the
continued political supportof identifiable interestgroups regularly appearing
before the courts. As a price for solving the funding crisis, therefore, the
judiciary necessarily acquires a stake-or, at least, the appearance of having
a stake-in resolving future cases in a manner that will preserve rather
than upend the fiscal solution the state courts have embraced in response
to the crisis. Those future cases, moreover, involve private litigants who
may have interests opposed to the judiciary's newfound prominent fiscal
allies, or who may be harmed by the governmental operations that must be
carried out if the new off-budget funding stream for the courts is to meet
its target.3° The visible nature of that fiscal stake, moreover, has its own
potentially corrosive effect on the reputation of the judiciary over time.
In consequence, what seem like "solutions" to the funding crisis, and
thus effective means of protecting an independent judiciary from the
budgetary axe, are not just solutions. They are also sources of conflicts
of interest between the judiciary's obligation to resolve disputes on the
legal merits and its interest in preserving its funding - conflicts that,
for all its present defects, the more deferential appropriations process
on which the judiciary historically relied did not present. The threat to
judicial independence involved does not easily translate into an articulable
(and thus litigable) constitutional claim that would assist the judiciary in
securing more funds. And far from aiding state courts in their pursuit of
fending off budget cuts, articulating this threat seems only to narrow the
kinds of creative fiscal solutions that state court leaders and their advocates
should feel good about pursuing.
In this respect, a focus on the crisis' harmful impact on the decisional,
rather than the fiscal independence of the judiciary demonstrates just how
acute the fiscal crisis is more than it offers an attractive way of solving it.
But that is precisely why it is important to attend to it. Doing so will enable,
and hopefully prompt, state court leaders and their advocates to better
appreciate the constitutional concerns that are raised by some seemingly
appealing strategies for managing a budgetary process that the fiscal crisis
increasingly encourages them to adopt. At present, their incentives run in
the opposite direction.
30 See discussion infra Part IV.
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IV. Two CASE STUDIES OF THE CONFLICT OVER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
To see how the state courts' quest for fiscal success in the legislature can
prove hazardous to the judiciary's reputation for independence, it is useful
to consider two stories in some detail. The first comes from Florida, and it
involves a state judiciary's attempt to opt out of the appropriations process
altogether.31 The story has become a well-known cautionary tale because
the fiscal experiment left the judiciary with even less fiscal security than
it had when it began. But that is not the reason to focus on it for present
purposes. The story also bears on the decisional independence of the state
courts and how it can be put at risk. There was little focus on that effect
of the shift away from the courts' reliance upon general appropriations
either in the failed aftermath of the establishment of a dedicated funding
stream-in this case, one overwhelmingly comprised of foreclosure filings
fees--or in the run up to its adoption. But a focus on that effect is critical.
The Florida story raises concerns that go well beyond the fact that, as it
happened, foreclosure filing fees turned out to be a most unreliable source
of revenue and thus that the dedicated funding stream proved illusory.
And those concerns speak directly to the ways in which the fiscal crisis
can encourage state court leaders to endorse "solutions" that erode their
decisional independence.
The second story comes from South Carolina. It concerns a political
campaign effectively waged by that state court, and its fearless chief
justice.32 Here, the story is often pointed to as a success because, through
the effective enlistment of the business community, attention was at last
focused on the needs of the state judiciary in ways that seemed unthinkable
at the start of the campaign. But, by reviewing this episode with an eye
on that campaign's effects on the judiciary's decisional independence, one
sees reason for concern. The prominent alliance between the judiciary and
a single interest group, here the business community, was strategically wise
as a political matter. That alliance, however, raises some troubling questions
about its potential effect on the judiciary's reputation for impartiality.
31 See REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP, STABILIZING REVENUES FOR THE STATE
COURTS SYSTEM AND CLERKS OF COURT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REVENUE STABILIZATION
WORKGROUP 7 (201 i), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/funding/bin/
RevenueStabilizationReport.pdf [hereinafter REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP].




Florida's courts relied on the general appropriations process for virtually
all of its revenue until 2009.33 As the state's fiscal situation darkened,
interest grew in finding ways of securing what seemed to be a more stable
funding stream. The legislature itself saw the advantages of such a shift.
It had the potential to free up funds at a time when revenue shortfalls
were looming. 34 The judiciary also saw great promise in a fiscal solution
that would free the courts from their historic reliance on a conventional
appropriations process. 35 The courts were increasingly losing ground in that
realm. A dedicated funding stream seemed a way out of a political process
in which the courts were not faring well.
At a special legislative session in January of 2009, the Florida legislature
created the State Courts Revenue Trust Fund (SCRTF).36 That fund
established a dedicated fund for state courts primarily made up of court
filing fees and fines.37 Then-Chief Justice Peggy Quince championed
this change, as did other judicial branch leaders and the Florida Bar
Association.3" In the spring of 2009, with the foreclosure and state budget
crises spreading, the legislature decided to subsidize the SCRTF further
33 FLA. STATE COURTS, 2009-2010 ANNUAL REPORT 6-7 (2010) [hereinafter FLORIDA
2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http:/lwww.flcourts.org/gen-public/pubslbin/annualre-
porto91o.pdf.
34 In January, 2009, the legislature was able to cut $15.9 million in general revenue fund-
ing for the state courts, because funds from the new trust fund made up nearly $11 million of
that. PEGGY A. QUINCE, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOV'T, SPECIAL SESSION A, 2009: A SUMMARY
OF BUDGET REDUCTIONS (SB2A), INCREASED PENALTIES (SB I2A), AND THE CREATION OF THE
STATE COURTS REVENUE TRUST FUND (SB i4 A) at 2 (2oo9), available at http://www.flcourts.org/
gen-public/funding/bin/SpecialSessionUpdate.pd f.
35 FLORIDA 2OIO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 6 ("On the whole, branch leaders
agree that the trust fund is a boon for the judicial branch: fueled by a portion of the filing fees
and fines that the clerks take in for the courts, the trust fund ensures the court system a stable
funding source that is able to support most court operations."); QUINCE, supra note 34, at 2
("More good news came with the Legislature's decision to create a new State Courts Revenue
Trust Fund, the first step in implementing the courts' plan for stabilizing court funding. It was
through this fund that the courts were shielded from deeper cuts.").
36 FLA. STAT. § 29.22 (2011) ("The State Courts Revenue Trust Fund is created within
the state courts system. Moneys credited to the trust fund shall be used for the purpose of
funding the activities of the state courts system."); see also 2009 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2009-
7 (West) (providing text of bill passed by Florida legislature during Special 'A' Session).
37 FLORIDA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 7.
38 Id. at 6; QUINCE, supra note 34, at z; Jesse H. Diner, Reflections on My Year as Bar
President, FLA. B.J., June 20O0, at 4, 4 (Florida's outgoing Bar Association president describes
"the success story of how we were able to accomplish a more stable funding source for the
courts, as last year the legislature redirected millions of dollars in filing fees and funds to the
state courts' revenue trust fund - and how this was particularly crucial with the astronomical
foreclosure cases flooding into our courts.").
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by raising foreclosure filing fees.3 9 Foreclosure filing fees became the
lifeblood of the state judiciary in Florida. By 2010-2011, ninety percent of
state courts' funding came from the SCRTF,4° and at the peak, foreclosure
filing fees provided seventy-nine percent of the courts' revenue.
41
Less than a year later, though, foreclosure filings plummeted. One key
reason was that lenders imposed a temporary moratorium on foreclosures,
partly in response to the worsening housing crisis. 43 In addition, a delay
resulted in an estimated 140,000 foreclosure cases due to the closure of
the law firm of David King, Broward County's so-called foreclosure king.'
According to the state courts' annual report, foreclosure filings dropped
from 30,000 to below 9,000 monthly.45 In the 2010-2011 fiscal year, revenue
estimates for foreclosure filing fees had to be revised downward from
$432 to $272.9 million, resulting in a $108 million deficit. 46 In total, the
court system needed almost $54 million from other funds to stay afloat
in 2010-2011. 47 In addition to seeking multiple emergency loans from the
governor,48 the judiciary survived on supplemental appropriations from the
legislature.
In response, efforts have been made to refine the trust fund system and
devise a more stable revenue base for the courts.49 A special report from
the court system itself- mandated by the legislature and conducted under
the auspices of the current chief justice-attempts to set out a new path
forward." But that new path, at its core, constitutes a return to the old one,
39 FLA. STATE COURTS, 2010-2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (201) [hereinafter FLORIDA
2011 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/pubs/bin/annual_re-
portioi i.pdf.
40 FLORIDA 20O0 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
41 FLORIDA 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
42 REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP, supra note 31, at 23.
43 John Kennedy, State's Recovery Hits Potholes, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 5, 2011, at AI
("The decline [in foreclosures] has several sources, including the moratorium on foreclosures
that lenders set last fall under federal pressure.").
44Id.
45 FLORIDA 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, Supra note 39, at 8.
46 Editorial, Courts Shouldn't Have to Beg, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at IoA.
47 REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP, supra note 3 1, at 7.
48 Editorial, supra note 46.
49 For instance, Chief Justice Canady appointed a Revenue Stabilization Workgroup,
comprised of six judges and six clerks, to study the problem. He also wrote in his introduction
to the state courts' 2010-2011 annual report: "[[In the past year, this branch has prioritized
developing a stable source of funding for Florida's courts." FLORIDA 2011 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 39, at I; see also id. at 9. ("'Stabilizing court funding remains my highest priority,'
emphasizes Chief Justice Canady, and the governor has indicated that a stable funding source
for the courts is a priority for him as well.").
50 The Revenue Stabilization Workgroup was comprised of six Florida judges and six
clerks of the court; the workgroup's report, entitled Stabilizing Revenue for the State Courts
System and Clerks of the Court, was published on November I, 2oi I. REVENUE STABILIZATION
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however flawed it may be. The report is insistent that revenue stabilization
should not be achieved by further increasing filing fees-whether or not
doing so would generate a stable revenue stream. Instead, the report calls
for a return to general appropriations funding for the core functions of the
court system.
The report premises this conclusion largely on the Florida Constitution's
recognition of an individual constitutional right of access to the courts, and
its judgment that further hiking the fees, which are already among the
highest in the nation,51 would be in tension with that state constitutional
right." The report explains that
[T]he balance between what the state must pay as a general obligation
of government and what the users should pay in order to access their
court system should be carefully aligned so Florida citizens are always
assured of their constitutional right of access to the courts without sale,
denial, or delay.5 3
The report does not, of course, adjudicate the constitutional issue
regarding the right of court access and how increased fees might infringe
it. But it does treat the decision to shift towards fee-based funding as more
than just a fiscal issue. It treats it as an issue that implicates the constitutional
obligation of the courts to remain open. The report is thus interestingly
attentive to the ways in which the fiscal crisis may tempt those searching
for court funds to opt for funding "solutions" that work only if one takes a
position on an underlying legal issue that does not directly pertain to the
constitutional status of the courts. Here, that legal issue would concern the
right of court access. In this way, the report implicitly acknowledges that the
fiscal crisis, insofar as it creates incentives for a shift to a fee-based system,
necessarily puts pressure on the decisional independence of the judiciary.
If the state courts have worked hard to craft a legislative compromise
that makes them heavily dependent on high court filing fees, they are
necessarily compromised when confronting a constitutional challenge to
the constitutionality of imposing those very fees on individuals seeking
access to the courts.
But the tension the report implicitly identifies between decisional and
fiscal independence is not restricted to the special case of extremely high
filing fees. It arises even in cases in which a filing fee is not so high that it
would interfere with a state constitutional right of court access. Consider the
foreclosure filing fee on which the courts became so dependent. Even if set
at a rate that could not be said to infringe the constitutional right of court
WORKGROUP, supra note 3 1, at 8.
51 Id. at 37. At nearly $2000, the foreclosure filing fee has been called "cost-prohibi-
tive" for many people fighting to save their homes. Janet Zink, No Court Foreclosures?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at IA.
52 REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP, supra note 31, at Io.
53 Id. at 5-
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access, it would still potentially compromise the decisional independence
of the judiciary on a range of matters.
A judiciary heavily dependent on such fees would at least risk seeming
to have a stake in the outcome of legal challenges that would make
the collection of such fees harder. After all, the lenders' moratorium on
foreclosures almost brought the judicial system to a halt in Florida 4 It is
not beyond imagination to think that the state judicial system itself might
have confronted legal challenges to the foreclosure process that could
have sought orders imposing effective moratoriums. Indeed, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts's recent ruling on the potential invalidity
of a mass of titles, due to banks' failure to properly record the titles'
conveyance to third-party investors,5 would have quite evident impacts
on the foreclosure filings that could then be made. In a state like Florida,
such a ruling would not only strike terror in the hearts of the holders of
suddenly legally ineffective mortgages. It could necessarily also be a cause
of concern for the judges themselves. They would, in so ruling, be severely
constricting the stream of funds on which their court system depends.
That is just one example of the kind of conflict that could arise.5 6 Florida
is one of only twenty states that require judicial proceedings to complete
a foreclosure. 7 Two Republican legislators authored a bill to create non-
judicial foreclosure procedures in 2010, known as the Homeowner Relief
and Housing Recovery Act. 8 The House version died in committee in
April of 2010,"9 but may come up again in the 2012 legislative session.
54 Katie Sanders, Courts Get$45 .6M State Loan, ST. PETERSBURG TMES, Oct. 13, 2011 , at
3B; Jan Pudlow, Courts and Clerks Work to Keep the Doors Open, FL. BAR NEWS, Mar. 15, 2011,
available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnewsoi.nsf/8c9f13oI Ib96736985256
aa9oo624829/dffgf2f5o627oa548525784900711342!OpenDocument (quoting various mem-
bers of judiciary saying that due to the drop in foreclosure filings, the SCRTF would run out
of money by the end of March, 2011 and without an emergency loan from the governor, "that
means closing the doors").
55 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011 ); see also Bevilacqua
v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 893 (Mass. zol 1). Justices in Massachusetts may confront the
issue of foreclosures again, as Massachusetts's Attorney General recently filed a suit against
five major banks over the use of robo-signing and other "unfair and deceptive" foreclosure
practices. Complaint at 27, z8, 50-53, Massachusetts v. Bank of Am., No. 1 1-4363 (Mass. filed
Dec. 1, 201 1), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/zo I/
five-national-banks-sued-by-ag-coakley.html.
56 For instance, it is possible that the courts' dependency on filing fees, and resulting
pressure to affirm foreclosures, could raise due process concerns. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5 10,
533 (927) (finding a violation of due process where the mayor acting as judge in a case knew
that a conviction would benefit his village financially).
57 Kimberly Miller, Courts Seek to Speed up Foreclosures, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 18, 2010,
at iA.
58 Homeowner Relief & Housing Recovery Act, H.B. 1523, 201o H.R. Reg. Sess. (Fla.
20 1 o), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx? Billd =44346
(last visited Jan. 24, 201i).
59 Kimberly Miller, Banks Fail in Bidto Bypass Court, PALM BEACH PosT, Apr. 13, 2OO, at
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Proponents argue the courts have created a massive foreclosure backlog that
is preventing economic recovery.' Opponents of the measure argue that at
the least any reform should include a waiver of the fee for homesteaded
property owners fighting foreclosure. 6' Interpretations of that legislation,
as well as constitutional challenges to it, present the same type of dilemma
for any court system that has chosen to make such fees its overwhelmingly
primary funding source.
Or consider the concern that, with its huge backlog of foreclosure
proceedings, Florida courts are reportedly dispatching many homeowners'
claims in under a minute.6 The Wall Street Journal has called this Florida's
"rocket docket," with some judges hearing 1,000 cases a day in 2009. 3
From June, 2010 to August, 2011, the courts handled 201,185 backlogged
cases, leaving 260,815 outstanding.64 What incentives do the courts have
to slow down such rocket dockets if they have voluntarily redesigned the
fiscal system for funding the courts in a way that contemplates the speedy
processing of those very matters?
Florida's experience is instructive, then, for reasons that go beyond
the lesson it teaches about the potential volatility of dedicated funding
streams. It is worth recalling that the general appropriations system-
which the court system's special commission is now celebrating as the key
to stabilizing the court's revenue base-was itself volatile. Indeed, it was
that very volatility that led to the search for a dedicated funding source.
So the problem in Florida, if there is one, cannot solely be that the fees
chosen were the wrong ones. In tight fiscal times, it is not obvious that
there is solace to be found in any funding stream, including perhaps most
especially appropriations from general revenues.
Rather, the Florida experience shows how the understandable desire
to protect against volatility in the general appropriations process can give
state court leaders and their advocates distorted incentives. A search for the
holy grail of the stable funding base, independent of political vicissitudes
and immune to economic fluctuations, led the Florida courts to embrace a
"solution" that threatened to compromise their decisional independence.
The chosen solution challenged their ability-and the appearance that
4B, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/moneylreal-estate/nonjudicial-foreclosure-
bill-dies-in-house-committee-556397.html.
60 Kimberly Miller, Court's "Cry for Help": Time to Overhaul Foreclosure Process?, PALM
BEACH PosT, May 23, 2011, at iA.
61 Zink, supra note 51.
62 Michael Corkery, A Florida Court's "RocketDocket" Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Ai, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12349175514ooo4565.
html.
63 Id.
64 Kimberly Miller, Fla. Foreclosure Backlog Shrinks 43% in a Year, PALM BEACH PosT, Aug.
I9, 2o i, at iA, available at http:llwww.palmbeachpost.com/money/foreclosures/florida-fore-
closure-backlog-shrinks-43-in-a-year-176o97.html.
[Vol. 100
STATE COURT FUNDING CRISIS
they would have the ability-to impartially assess the meaning of the
constitutional right of access to the Florida courts. That same solution also
jeopardized their decisional independence in confronting those cases that
would challenge the speed and ease with which Florida law permits homes
to be foreclosed-an issue of public policy that became of paramount
importance to the state's population and to Florida's economic future.
Florida's experience, then, offers a vivid illustration of how the search for
fiscal independence for the state courts can end up compromising decisional
independence in ways that are easy to overlook-and that, unfortunately,
often are.
In other fields of regulation, potential conflicts like these are the
subject of continuous concern. The decision to make the Food and Drug
Administration dependent upon the filing fees of those it regulates was well
understood to pose a serious threat to its capacity to render independent
judgment. 65 The fact that ratings agencies live off of the fees paid by the
companies they rate for fiscal soundness is a notorious example of the ways
in which regulators become compromised by the funding sources on which
they rely.66 Conversely, the decision to exempt the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau from the ordinary appropriations process, and to tie its
funding to fees collected by a distinct agency, the Federal Reserve, the
regulatory powers of which it was assuming,67 was intended to maximize the
decisional independence of that new agency.68 State court leaders and their
advocates, no less than the legislators who negotiate funding solutions with
65 See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Conflicts of Interest in the Drug Industry's Relationship with the
Government, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737, 739-40 (2oo6). The author points out that since the pas-
sage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, user fees have grown to provide a fifth
of FDA funds, id. at 739, and argues that user fee acts are a "structural conflict of interest"
that the FDA must resolve "if the agency is going to once again become the gold standard for
federal regulatory agencies." Id. at 740.
66 Aline Darbellay & Frank Parnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 30
No. 12 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES PoL'Y REP. 1, 3 (2O 1) (explaining that under the issuer-pay
model, leading rating agencies "compromised their standards in order to capture higher fees
from increasingly complex deals").
67 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1017, 12 U.S.C. §
5497(a)(I) (2oio) ("Each year (or quarter of such year)... the Board of Governors shall transfer
to the Bureau from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, the amount deter-
mined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau
under Federal consumer financial law .....").
68 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's independent source of funding, id., re-
mains one of the most politically contentious aspects of its establishment. See, e.g., Letter from
Rush Holt, Barney Frank & Brad Miller, U.S. Reps., U.S. H.R., to Colleagues in U.S. H.R.,
(Feb. 2011), available at http://holt.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i
d=77 I &Itemid= 114. The letter objects to Republican attempts to limit funding for the CFPB,
id., and notes that in 2010, "Congress agreed that in order for this new financial watchdog to
be effective, it must be independent and adequately funded. By deriving its operating budget
from the Federal Reserve, it would be insulated from the types of partisan fights on Capitol
Hill in which we find ourselves today." Id.
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them, need to recognize that a similar dynamic relationship exists between
the mechanisms of court funding and court decision making. It should not
be assumed that the courts are so distinct that their own reputation for
impartial judgment-even assuming their unshakable capacity to exercise
it-will not suffer from fiscal arrangements that work only if the legal
interests of certain classes of private litigants are systematically rejected.
Florida seems to have-if only implicitly-internalized this lesson. Its
court system is now on record as opposing a return to a fee based funding
system because of its adverse impact on a state constitutional right that
the courts themselves would be charged with vindicating. 69 But the court
system came to this judgment in circumstances in which the fiscal solution
that compromised the state court system's decisional independence proved
to be no solution at all. The question is whether the general appropriations
process would have seemed as preferable if the foreclosure filing fees had
continued to roll in.
B. South Carolina
Faced with a fiscal crisis of its own, South Carolina's judiciary, too, went
in search of fees.70 The search began in earnest following the 2009-2010
legislative session." The judiciary had endured the largest percentage
budget cut of any court system in the nation, losing more than 40 percent
of its general revenue in a less than two-year period.7" The House Ways
and Means Committee was proposing yet further cuts.73 As a solution,
long-time Chief Justice Jean Toal backed a bill that would have increased
the state court civil filing fee.74 But she did more than express support
for it. Convinced the judiciary was not likely to fare well in the general
appropriations process for the foreseeable future, and that the state
legislature was not taking the need for funds as seriously as she believed
it should, she decided to mount a full fledged lobbying campaign for more
fees.7"
Doing so required Chief Justice Toal to take on a much more public
role within the legislative process. Key to her effort was the decision to
69 REVENUE STABILIZATION WORKGROUP, supra note 31, at 3.
70 Frierson, supra note 6, at 2.
71 Id. at I.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Fred Horlbeck, Filing Fees Touted as South Carolina Budget Salve, S.C. LAW. WKLY., Apr.
5, 2010 (reporting that the legislator who sponsored the bill to raise filing fees said Chief Justice
Toal "proposed the language of H. 4595 and that he filed the bill at her request"); see also Press
Release, Chief Justice Jean H. Toal, S.C. Supreme Court, (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter Toal
Press Release], available at http://sccourts.org/whatsnewldisplaywhatsnew.cfm?indexlD=654
(expressing Chief Justice Toal's support for overriding the gubernatorial veto of H. 3161).
75 Frierson, supra note 6, at 4.
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forge an overt alliance between the judiciary and the business community.76
That previously dormant tie became strikingly visible. At one level, the
alliance simply expanded the constituency for the courts, extending its
reach beyond trial lawyers prominent in the support of increased judicial
funding. Indeed, in August, 2010, the new president of the plaintiffs'
group South Carolina Association for Justice, Mark Joye, announced that
protecting funding would require coordination with the business allies." A
personal injury lawyer himself, Joye told the South Carolina Lawyers' Weekly,
"[T]he association wants to coordinate efforts with business groups, lawyer
organizations and corporations to teach the General Assembly about the
problem," and he added that "[y]ou will see this year affiliations that you
might normally never see." '78
Still, it was clear that the reason for reaching out to the business
community went beyond a desire to show the judiciary was not associated
only with those interests then supporting it and thus to facilitate a more
general appeal on behalf of the court system. The reason to solicit business
community support was also more affirmative. The chief justice saw value,
as a matter of shrewd budget politics, in beginning to associate the business
community's interests with that of the state courts. As the campaign to
convince the legislature to support the bill intensified, Toal met with the
general counsel of the Boeing Corporation, himself a former Fourth Circuit
judge. He then began to make the case that a strong court system was critical
in Boeing's decision to come to South Carolina in the first place.79 The
chief justice similarly made visits to a number of different business leaders
to make the case that a well-funded court system held distinct benefits
for the business community, and the in-state BMW representative, who
chaired the South Carolina Manufacturers' alliance, invited Chief Justice
Toal to give the keynote address at its winter meeting."
Interestingly, the alliance that Toal forged faced resistance from
lawmakers who claimed to be concerned that the proposed funding bill-
by hiking filing fees-did not comport with the constitutional function of
the courts.8 As much as Toal and her supporters emphasized the threat
that the judiciary faced from severe underfunding, legislators expressed
concern that a shift to fees would produce a two-tiered system of justice
based on ability to pay.8" But ultimately, Toal and her allies saw no more
viable funding mechanism-and certainly none that would potentially put
76 See generally Frierson, supra note 6.
77 Fred Horlbeck, Nero Leader of S.C. Association forJustice Mark C. Joye to Push forJudicial
Funding, S.C. LAwYERS WKLY., Aug. 16, 2oio.
78 Id.
79 Frierson, supra note 6, at 1-2.
8o Id. at 2.
81 Id. at 4.
82 Id. at 5.
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the court on a stable revenue footing that would spare it from the kind of
devastating legislative cuts it had just recently endured.83 In the end, the
fee bill passed, only to be vetoed by the governor.' In his veto message,
Governor Sanford explained that he believed "'there is something
fundamentally wrong when the Judiciary must depend on increased fees
on the courts' users for its existence.' '8 Toal and her allies continued to
press the legislature to override the veto,86 but the effort failed when an
override vote fell short.87
Still, the lobbying paid off. The campaign produced widespread
appreciation for the fiscal peril the courts faced, as well as for the special
constitutional role the courts play-a role that could no longer be conceived
of just another service that users could be made to pay for on an as needed
basis. Thus, as much as Toal and her fellow advocates for the state courts
were willing to compromise qn that point, as they saw no alternative that
could keep the courts funded, the executive and legislative branches'
refusal to do so proved beneficial. In the wake of the failed veto override,
budget reallocations were made and general funds totaling more than $20
million were appropriated to the judicial branch in part to make up for the
rejection of the fee hike.
The South Carolina story is, in important respects, certainly one of
successful judicial leadership. An energetic, motivated state court chief
justice took on a political system that had shown little interest in funding the
state courts. Through her imaginative and even unprecedented politicking,
she managed to change the terms of political debate and achieve an
important budgetary victory for her branch's fiscal independence. But from
the perspective of the judiciary's decisional independence, the story is a
less than completely happy one. The price of the victory was not trivial.
Along the way, the courts became invested in the support of a new funding
scheme that would have essentially pretermitted the viability of right-of-
access challenges to it. And the judiciary had become visibly aligned with
the business community. It had begun to overtly organize its legislative
appeal around an account of the way the state court system could assist
economic development.
83 Id.; see also Paul Tharp, Bill to Raise Court Fees Clears South Carolina House, Senate, S.C.
LAWYERS WKLY., May 1o, 2010 ("'The viability of our judicial system depends on the fee bill,'
Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal told Lawyers Weekly. 'The courts would be in extreme dire
straits without these funds."'); Toal Press Release, supra note 74.
84 Frierson, supra note 6, at 5.
85 Frierson, supra note 6, at 5.
86 Toal Press Release, supra note 74 ("It is imperative that the Governor's veto be over-
ridden and that H. 3161 be approved for the two year period to avoid the impending perilous
funding crisis of the Judicial Branch.").
87 SC House Upholds Governors Veto of Court Fee Increases, AssocIATED PRESS (May 13,2010,
5:00 PM), http://www.carolinalive.com/news/story.aspx?id=456714#.Tx8AYSMzLnk.
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Indeed, on January 27, 2011, Toal made her annual presentation to the
Ways and Means Committee.18 Unlike the prior year, her presentation
began with a slide emphasizing the courts' economic importance:
Ability of the Judicial Branch to fairly and timely resolve
disputes is a highly important consideration in economic
development
" South Carolina Business Courts
" Significant consideration in Boeing
coming to South Carolina.8 9
And on March 2, 2011, in her annual State of the Judiciary address, Toal
told the full legislature that:
[t]he business community rallied to the side of the Judicial Branch last
year as you seriously debated Judicial funding. Their message was clear.
The ability of a state court system to fairly and timely resolve disputes
is a highly important consideration in attracting new businesses to South
Carolina. When court funding was in peril, Boeing representatives
publically stepped forward to emphasize that a stable court system and
such innovations as the business court docket were key considerations
in Boeing's decision to make a major investment in South Carolina.9
In doing so, Chief Justice Toal appears to have been the only chief
justice to single out a particular company for praise in her state of the
judiciary speech. 91
There is no violation of any canon of ethics in her having done so. Nor,
in light of her reputation, is there any basis for suggesting in any way that
her overt invocation of the business community's interests and its support
for her funding request compromised her ability to decide cas-es fairly. The
concern is more diffuse. It is that the judiciary's overt political campaign on
behalf of more funding had tied it too tightly to the business community.
A column in the state's leading newspaper well articulated the potential
problem.9 Acknowledging Chief Justice's Toal's heroic efforts on behalf
88 Jean Hoefer Toal, Chief Justice, S.C. Supreme Court, Presentation to South Carolina
House Ways and Means Sub-Committee (Jan. 27, 201 i), available at http://sccourts.org/
whatsnew/displaywhatsnew.cfm?indexlD=705.
89 Id.
90 Jean Hoffer Toal, Chief Justice, S.C. Supreme Court, Address to Joint Session of the
South Carolina General Assembly: State of the Judiciary 2011 (March 2, 201 I), available at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/HTMLfiles/SOJ2oi itext.pdf.
91 The National Center for State Courts maintains an archive of State of the Judiciary
speeches by year. Interbranch Relations: State Links, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://
www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Management/Interbranch-Relations/State-Links.aspx (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2012).
92 Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., How the Legislature Compromises Our Courts, THE STATE,
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of her branch, the column expressed deep concern with the emergence of
a political economy that all but forced her, in order to make a case against
dramatic cutbacks, to tie herself (and her branch) so tightly to the business
community's interests and to the support of a single named company. The
chief justice "inadvertently revealed how the Legislature's disrespect
compromises our judiciary," the column concluded.93 "What's worrisome
is the ethical position it puts the court in when one of those court-friendly
businesses finds itself in a dispute before the court. How confident would
you feel about getting a fair hearing if you were on the other side of that
lawsuit?"9 4
That question must be kept in mind by legislators who might be
inclined to think that such a plea from the judicial branch should become
the norm if funds are to be made available. It should also be kept in mind
by judicial leaders and their supporters as they think about the kinds of
lobbying campaigns that they should be putting together when confronted
with a recalcitrant legislature.
More generally, it is worth noting that the South Carolina story is
not altogether unique. It may even become-absent recognition of the
troubling precedent it creates-a template for how budget negotiations
over judicial funding may proceed in the future. Already, there are efforts
to reframe the judicial demand for funding in terms that frame the court
system's function in expressly economic terms. 9 State court systems have
sought out economic consulting firms to prepare economic analyses to
demonstrate that a poorly funded court system can undermine economic




95 See Mark Cady, Chief Justice, Iowa Supreme Court, Address to a Joint Session of
the Iowa General Assembly: State of the Judiciary 2012, at 1-2 (Jan. iI, 2012), available at
http:l/www.iowacourts.govlwfdata/fileslStateofJudiciary/2zl/Webspeech.pdf (describing
World Bank and U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies proving that "[a] strong court system
can play an important role, if not become the real catalyst, in achieving economic prosperity
in Iowa"); Randall T Shepard, Chief Justice, Ind. Supreme Court, Address to Joint Session
of the Indiana General Assembly: State of the Judiciary (Jan. II, 2012), available at www.
in.gov/judiciary/supreme/files/soj-2o12.pdf (lauding Indiana's courts for not being "a bar-
rier to economic development," unlike "states where businesses shy away because of the
litigation climate"); Editorial, Healthy Courts Are a Must for Iowa: Chief Justice is Persuasive in
Request for Resources, DES MOINES REG., Jan. it, 2012, http:l/www.desmoinesregister.comar-
ticle/2oi 2011 ZOPINIONo3I3o I 2oo27lolCONTACTSo7/?odyssey=nav Ihead ("Iowa Chief
Justice Mark Cady made an unusual pitch to the General Assembly for why lawmakers should
support healthy courts in this state: It's good for business. That was a smart tactic ....").
96 TiE WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA ECONOMY OF DELAYS
IN GEORGIA'S STATE COURTS DUETo RECENT REDUCTIONS IN FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(Dec. 23, 2010), available at http:l/www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/zo1%2oGeorgia%2o
Bar%2oEconomic%2ompacts.
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commissioned a report from the Washington Economics Group on the
economic impact of court funding cuts, which documented the "adverse
economic impacts" of cuts to the state courts.97 By calculating time and
opportunities foregone by court officials as well as businesses due to court
delays, the report estimated that "120,219 permanent jobs for Florida's
residents are adversely impacted by civil case delays resulting from
inadequate funding for Florida's courts."98 In addition to lost wages, the
report calculated that the loss in business revenue from civil court case
delays would "adversely impact" $9.8 billion in GDP 99 and $17.4 billion
in gross economic output for Florida annually.'l ° Neither the Florida nor
the Georgia report by the Washington Economics Group projects losses
to a specific company, but in estimating the impact of delays generally
across industry, the Florida report stated the biggest impact would be on
"Knowledge-Based Services."' l0
This kind of economic argument may well have force, but it is important
to consider the jurisprudential context that such a reframings of the case
for fiscally independent courts establish. These reframings suggest that a
state court funding request is powerful to the extent that the state court
system is enhancing the economic climate within the state, or boosting
gross domestic product. They even go so far as to emphasize the particular
benefit courts seem to be providing to specified business sectors-such as
the knowledge-based industries.
Of course, such appeals do not promise any particular decisional
outcomes. They usually rely on general language that could be read to
suggest it is the timeliness of the judiciary's resolution of business disputes,
more than the substantive manner in which such suits are resolved, that
is of economic significance. But is that a plausible account? Surely the
substance of a given judicial system's decisions can have economic impacts.
There is a whole school of legal analysis devoted to that very premise.
And so the concern is that these kinds of framings of the case for more
judicial funding-aimed at protecting the fiscal independence of the
judiciary-will constrain, even if only subtly, the judiciary's own approach
to the myriad cases in which they may confront legal challenges that, if
vindicated, would impose costs on the business community generally or
specific business sectors in particular. And even if courts do not-as they
should not-have their eye on their own case for funding in resolving such
cases, the concern about appearances is not trivial. One need only think of
trade secrets cases, or disputes about the meaning of non compete contracts,
97 THE WASH. ECON. GRP., ThIE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN
FLORIDA'S STATE COURTS DUE TO UNDER-FUNDING OF COURT SYSTEM 15 (2009).
98 Id. at io.
99 Id. at 13.
Ioo Id. at 14.
o I Id. at 13.
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or those involving the validity of mandatory arbitration contracts to see that
the judiciary should be concerned with associating itself too closely with
arguments that they need funding because they perform a function that
will be "good" for business.
Relatedly, there is the concern that such reframings could lead state
judicial leaders to begin to organize the judiciary in terms that will be
perceived as business friendly, perhaps by devoting resources-scarce
though they are-to creating specialized dockets and tribunals aimed at
placing business disputes at the front of what are now lengthy case lines. As
mentioned, some form of specialized business courts or dedicated business
or commercial dockets exist in approximately nineteen states.'0
The South Carolina story, like the Florida story is a complicated one. In
each, the judiciary confronted severe cuts to its operations by legislatures
strapped due to their more general fiscal crises. Like any effective agency
in-fighter, the "agency" leaders sought to find an effective means of
moving the legislature to come to its aid. Politics seemed to suggest that
certain kinds of appeals-in the present climate-would be more effective
than others. And they also led the judicial leaders in each instance to see
the advantages of funding proposals that would seemingly create "new"
money-in the form of fees-that would enable the legislature to both
keep general appropriations low and avoid imposing taxes. These were
understandable-even creative-decisions by leaders confronting true
crises. But it is important to also see that they involved more than simple
efforts to advance and protect judicial independence. Because of the
political economy that had emerged in the wake of fiscal crisis, such efforts
were not costless to the judiciary-and its independence-even though
they were, at points, successful in finding ways of persuading legislatures
to spare the courts' operating cuts that would have been quite severe. A
strategy for securing funds in tight fiscal times is not a failure, in other
words, only insofar as it fails to identify and establish a stable off-budget
stream of dollars for the courts. Nor is it a success only insofar as it does
identify such a stream. And the judicial system does not emerge stronger
and more independent so long as it leaves a budgetary session with more
funds on hand at the end than it seemed likely to obtain at the beginning.
That kind of dollar-based, bottom-line assessment fails to account for the
special constitutional role that courts play, not only in resolving disputes
102 See Lee Applebaum, Some Observations on Modern Business Courts and the Bar's
Role in their Development 5-8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript presented to ABA Business
Bar Leaders Conference), available at http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Specialty-Courts/Business-
Specialty-Courts/Resource-Guide.aspx (listing nineteen states with business courts, business
calendars or specialized business dockets); Amy G. Doehring, Specialized Courts Continue to
Take Hold, ABA LITIG. NEws (Aug. 14, 2oo9), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigation-
news/topstories/specialized-courts-complex-litigation.html ("More than 15 states now have
implemented, or are currently considering, some type of court dedicated to resolving business
cases or cases involving complex litigation.").
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efficiently, but also free from the suspicion that their own interest in
maintaining a healthy budget is motivating the substance of its opinions.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, sometimes you can lose by winning. Leaders of our state
courts have an obligation to be attentive to that possibility. And state
legislators have an obligation to avoid placing them in a position that
encourages them to win in such a compromising fashion. None of this
is to say state courts enjoy some inherent right to operate inefficiently.
Nor is it to say that the kind of fiscal politicking that the current crisis-
inspired fiscal competition encourages state court leaders to engage in
bears no resemblance to the kind of politicking that preceded it. No state
court system is an island, immune to political forces and realities, and no
effective state court leader has ever been able to act as if it is. But it is to say
that state court leaders and legislators, in confronting tough budget choices,
must recognize that the amount of harm the current funding crisis causes
is not solely a function of the amount of money the state courts ultimately
get. The mechanisms we use to fund our courts matter as much as the
amount of funding that we give them, and thus the crisis will hardly have
been solved if the price for keeping our state courts well-funded has been
to diminish their reputation for impartiality.
To be sure, the potential harm to decisional independence that funding
"solutions" may inflict is not likely to show up immediately or directly. It
is a harm that will manifest itself over time in a loss of public confidence in
the judiciary's impartiality, or in a gradual shift in the court's jurisprudential
approach to cases that implicate the fiscal strategies they have pursued
that give rise to such conflicts. For that reason, the real adverse effect will
not be evident until some time has passed. But by that time, the lasting
harm to the judiciary's decisional independence may already have been
done. Attending to this potential threat now, therefore, is critical so that
legislators engaged in upcoming budget negotiations, as well as state court
leaders and advocates focused on emerging from those negotiations with
judicial funding intact, appreciate the stakes. The more they do, the more
they will be attuned to the tradeoffs they may be making between the
judiciary's fiscal and decisional independence, both of which have been put
at risk by the current funding crisis.
The political economy that creates the risk to judicial independence,
of course, is not one to which state court leaders are uniquely subject. The
fiscal crisis in the states-like the budget pressures experienced at all levels
and sectors of government-poses dilemmas for public officials seeking
fiscal independence across the board. But the general appeal of funding
mechanisms that free public officials from the vicissitudes of the traditional
appropriations process poses special concerns when judicial officials begin
to succumb to it. And so, too, the trend towards positioning state courts
20I1-20121
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
as business development assets should be concerning to those interested
in preserving the courts' independent reputation, notwithstanding that
trend's evident value as a political strategy come budget time.
Tradeoffs between decisional independence and fiscal independence
that might seem acceptable in many contexts are necessarily more
concerning when judicial leaders are forced to make them as a routine
matter. It is possible, even familiar, to acknowledge the realist insight that
one of the ways a governmental agency's mission is defined is through the
means used to fund that agency. A standard observation, for example, is
that an agency's enforcement power is not simply a product of the scope
of its delegated regulatory power. It is also a function of the resources that
have been appropriated to permit it to exercise that delegated power. For
that reason, a decision to compromise an agency's decisional independence
to ensure that the agency maintains a secure revenue stream may properly
be understood to reflect a legislative policy decision that accommodates
fiscal realities. But surely a different calculus is appropriate for the judicial
branch. Its constitutionally assigned mission depends upon its decisional
independence. The kind of tradeoffs that agencies generally may be forced
to make in tight economic times, then, are not ones that we should be
content to have our judges make. And yet, the evidence suggests that,
absent a special solicitude among appropriators for the judiciary, it is
precisely such tradeoffs that judicial leaders may come to believe that they,
too, must make in order to survive. If so, the fiscal crisis's damage will have
been done however well funded our courts may be.
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